Drummond Reed: Target system where the DID is registered. (includes requirements) ✪
Dave Longley: DID client, DID server (where the server could talk to a separated "target system" but that may be integrated with the "server") ✪
Manu Sporny: Can we get away with 2? What are the conforment differences with a client for resolver and for a ledger? ✪
Dave Longley: Seems like the "third" is just an optional abstraction ✪
Markus Sabadello: Universal resolver project has a read me : Local resolver - executed locally. Web resolver. Client resolver - the client that calls the resolver. ✪
Markus Sabadello: Web resolver - executes methods directly but exposes API ✪
Chris Webber: Think of DNS client vs DNS server :) ✪
Markus Sabadello: Local resolver - always talks to the target system ✪
Dave Longley: DID client (give it a DID and it returns a DID doc). ... how does it do that? it contacts the "DID server" for the DID's method and follows whatever specific rules are defined by the DID method. ✪
Christian Lundkvist: This was the simplest possible way to gather up all the data we would be interested in for the DID Doc. The DID is a root of trust, a certificate of yourself as a root authority. ✪
Manu Sporny: Concern is multi fold. We had this array of keys. Then we moved to auth cred (which was imperfect). Use "authentically material" ✪
Sam Smith: Key rotation is at least as important use case as authentically material ✪
Manu Sporny: Argument - when you have a giant bag of keys, it is expected to be abused more. So instead of keys, we use authentication materials. ✪
Mike Lodder: I don't see how this makes it better because authentication material can be interpreted as passwords ✪
Drummond Reed: Must decide what is going to be in this array. ✪
Drummond Reed: At RWoT there was a large group that felt almost unan to call it biometric key. ✪
Drummond Reed: DID docs are the foundation to address key management ✪
Drummond Reed: Auth is one of the classic use cases, but not the only use case. Boiled down to a type, idea, and a value ✪
Sam Smith: While I agree with Manu that a generic field could tend to overuse as in the data example, I think that cryptographic keys are not nearly so generic. And keys are used for at least two purposes that make sense both authentication and encryption but why should we care ✪
Sam Smith: About the use. We just specify the key and suite and let the user fo the key material decide ✪
Sam Smith: If we want to have relationships then have a separate section that defines the use of the key ✪
Dave Longley: How do these things relate to the subject? How you use the key is defined by another spec. Ex: data sig ✪
Mike Lodder: Does not agree that it should be called auth materials. You are opening it up for people to put other stuff in there. It's too specific. ✪
Dave Longley: (The same problem exists) ... "public" could be used as a prefix to address those points. ✪
Dave Longley: "Indexed by type" is the proposal here -- no clear relationship between subject and object. ✪
Manu Sporny: Need to have separate discussions between arrays and service objects ✪
Dave Longley: The array should be considered a set, not an ordered list ✪
Christian Lundkvist: We use DID docs to look up auth keys, not to look up encryption keys. But that may not always be the case. ✪
Christian Lundkvist: Need to include Key material for roots of trust (ex: signing something) ✪
Manu Sporny: We need to remember that we're using a graph model, information from different graphs can be merged (open world assumption), therefore we should be very specific with semantics [scribe assist by Markus Sabadello] ✪
Sam Smith: If we accept the relation model then we should not have a keys field we should have each key have its specific relationship as determined by the user. We merely specify what the format of a key looks like not where it is stored ✪
Chris Webber: I'm not sure the type property specifies what it's used for but what kind of key structure it is... ✪
Dave Longley: It would be better (for implementations) if you can't get to the key unless you've gone through the proper relationship to arrive there. -- that is a key distinction in how the data is modeled, it's *not* the same. ✪
Manu Sporny: Identify the conflated arguments with the specifics on relationships. ✪
Manu Sporny: I don't think that the 'type' is used in the way that Drummond wants it to be used ... :) ✪
Chris Webber: That still doesn't address the ambient authority problem ✪
Manu Sporny: I think we're miscommunicating big time :) ✪
Susan Bradford: Should we have a separate meeting just on this topic? ✪
Manu Sporny: I think we keep going, suedonym -- it's a part of this discussion. ✪
Manu Sporny: Still need to have purpose discussion. ✪
Sam Smith: I think there is some conflating of type and purpose there is a general purpose of cryptographic operation type and a specific purpose within a given application ✪
Dave Longley: You don't get to the data unless you've gone through the appropriate relationship to find it ✪
Manu Sporny: SamSmith, I agree, we need to unpack that discussion. ✪
Dave Longley: If we uphold that as the model, people are less likely to mess up their implementations ✪
Sam Smith: Conflating purpose within an application and crypto field ✪
Drummond Reed: Ok, let's pick this up next time. ✪
Manu Sporny: I think we need to propose two things, discuss differences. Maybe we want to back burner this discussion and pick up some of the other more easy ones. ✪